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Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 14 February 2022, 19:17
by pozzie
Thoughts?

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 14 February 2022, 19:59
by Marmaduke
Russia is doing what Russia does and is testing the limits of those around it. They just weren’t ready for the NATO block to play them at their own game this time and slap them around with a misinformation war. Plant the idea that they’re going to invade imminently, make it so they can’t help but lose face. They’re in a no win corner. Happily for Russia, there’s no pressing rush for them to try and exit the corner. So they won’t. They’re paying for the 100,000 soldiers either way, might as well sit them there whilst they figure out their next move.

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 15 February 2022, 19:13
by PopTart
Yep, Russia is between a rock and a hard place.

They don't want to provoke actual conflict with Nato. But they do want to try their luck and get what they can in terms of economic or strategic concessions.

Thing is, both the west and Russia come out of the whole deal, looking stupid. :shrug:

But in truth, for the west, it isn't really about Russia and Ukraine, for the Americans and Brits atleast, it's really about China.

If Russia can sweep in and demand spheres of influence and zones of exclusion to Western powers, so too can China. More so with China, since they are the US's primary competition these days.

Being firm with Russia (without commiting to actual conflict) is about sending a message to China I believe.

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 15 February 2022, 23:07
by Severelius
I'm mostly just baffled by the amount of people who are making excuses to somehow justify how NATO are the aggressors and that Russia is just a poor victim forced to defend itself against unwarranted and illegal Western expansion.

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 16 February 2022, 07:04
by pozzie
Can't say I've got this figured out by any means though we might have more of an answer by the time I wake up tomorrow (Wednesday) morning.

1) I can't help but feel this is something like Kim's attention-seeking missile launches. It's hard to get the leaders' attention of NATO countries. Maybe Putin & the Russians feel their concerns have gone ignored for too long. And clearly the Belarus protests after the election were something of a wake-up call.

2) Any negotiator will tell you to ask for (way) more than you'll accept and offer way less than you can live with. I don't know how this plays into Russia's ask though I think they are pretty firm in their basic concepts.

3) Can't get past this is just a way to make Biden look like an idiot. If they don't invade, than all Biden's rhetoric makes him sound like Chicken Little. If they decide to invade, then Biden (and the rest of the West) will simply look weak no matter how aggressive the sanctions are.

Bottom line, think Putin has nothing to lose and plenty to gain. I am convinced though that he wants Russia's sphere of influence to return to something like the days of the Cold War. So yes, I accept that Putin is unhappy with the current 'Balance of Power'.

I hadn't thought about how this is, on some level, staged for China's benefit as it seeks to project its influence around the planet. That's a very interesting take on the whole mess as well.

We'll see soon enough it appears.

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 17 February 2022, 17:27
by PopTart
I dunno. I do think that Russia, has legitimate security concerns.

That is, if you accept and acknowledge that Russia has always been paranoid and mistrustful of western intentions. Not without good reason, western powers have historically taken to invading Russia and at great cost to Russians.

The problem is, that modern western powers aren't likely to be marching alongside tanks to Moscow. But Putin and the Russians, I don't believe, think like that.

It's merely that they could. And that is reason enough for Russia to feel insecure.

They also have a point about missles on their doorstep. The comparison to the US and Cuba, is compelling, If you accept the paranoia in Russias thinking.

But it's also clear as day, that Russia is being opportunitistic. Putin believes in a pan slavic super nation and very much wants a sphere of influence, ala old world style, that reflects such a super state, with Moscow as the capital.

Putin wants Ukraine and probably the baltic States, to be pro-russia and not pro-western. He wants a narrower western border with the growing EU.

I'm not really sure what western politicians want, I don't think they do either.

As I said, it's more about China for the US. Which is ironic, since they are driving Russia right into Chinas arms, when really, Russia would make for a good ally against China. :facepalm2:

I havent a clue what the UK wants to get out of it. Since Boris runs a kakistocracy, I doubt he has much of a clue either.

And everyone on Europe seems to be pulling in different directions and very much crossed purposes.

:shrug:

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 17 February 2022, 22:03
by pozzie
Clarification needed:

PopTart wrote:Putin wants Ukraine and probably the baltic States, to be pro-russia and not pro-western. He wants a narrower western border with the growing EU.


Does Putin want a narrower or wider buffer region between it and the EU?

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 18 February 2022, 05:44
by PopTart
No, I think strategically, Russia wants a narrower, more easily defended border, and greater territorial presence, more than they want a buffer state.

If Ukraine applied to become part of Russia tomorrow, Putin would accept its accession and annex the place the following day. Which would erase the buffer state he claims he desires between Russia and Nato.

The buffer state argument is a Red herring.

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 18 February 2022, 07:08
by pozzie
Okay, now I follow. Thanks for the explanation.

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 18 February 2022, 19:34
by Brenden
I'm surprised not many people are talking about the coincidence that this Ukraine situation should arise while Hunter Biden's daddy is President.

A "crisis" which has been pushed, without evidence, by the Biden Administration, counter to what Ukraine and European countries have been saying about the situation.

I mean, Kennedy showed us, the public, the spy-plane photos that precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis, but I have yet to see or hear anything evidentiary to the Biden Administration's claims about Russia and Ukraine.

We're now well past Wednesday the 16th, when the Biden Administration claimed Russia would pounce.

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 18 February 2022, 19:48
by McTaggartfan
Brenden wrote:I'm surprised not many people are talking about the coincidence that this Ukraine situation should arise while Hunter Biden's daddy is President.

A "crisis" which has been pushed, without evidence, by the Biden Administration, counter to what Ukraine and European countries have been saying about the situation.

I mean, Kennedy showed us, the public, the spy-plane photos that precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis, but I have yet to see or hear anything evidentiary to the Biden Administration's claims about Russia and Ukraine.

We're now well past Wednesday the 16th, when the Biden Administration claimed Russia would pounce.


It's clear that England just needs to conquer Russia and return to its former imperial glory.

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 22 February 2022, 20:25
by pozzie
So, anyone have a take on ordering "peacekeeping" troops into two breakaway "people's republics" that were 'formerly' part of Ukraine?

Can't help but thinking about Putin and Chechnya.

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 22 February 2022, 20:54
by PopTart
I dunno, I think after that speech he gave the other day, Putin has backed himself into a corner. I think he might actually invade before too long.

I honestly think most Ukrainians, even those that used to be pro-Russian, are turning against Russia and Putin. Public opinion seems to be souring towards him.

A Ukrainian I was talking to, was adamant that most Ukrainians had fled from Donetsk and Luhansk awhile back and that the areas were dominated now by Russians and Russian military personnel.

I doubt much resistance is present on the ground.

I guess it remains to be seen, if Putin will continue to nibble away at Ukraine. I doubt the west will do anything more to stop him.

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 24 February 2022, 14:23
by poolerboy0077
My guess is sanctions will be the extent of it given Americans are already complaining about gas prices and whatnot.

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 24 February 2022, 19:12
by pozzie
Sorry folks. I thought the poll was set up to allow us to change our votes - that had been my intent and I thought it was possible yesterday. Today I noticed it wasn't. You can change your votes if you like now.

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 24 February 2022, 22:06
by Brenden
pozzie wrote:Sorry folks. I thought the poll was set up to allow us to change our votes - that had been my intent and I thought it was possible yesterday. Today I noticed it wasn't. You can change your votes if you like now.

lol, I changed it this morning to lock the votes in since now the event has occurred.

Why would you want people to change their prediction after the fact?

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 24 February 2022, 23:44
by pozzie
Brenden wrote:
pozzie wrote:Sorry folks. I thought the poll was set up to allow us to change our votes - that had been my intent and I thought it was possible yesterday. Today I noticed it wasn't. You can change your votes if you like now.

lol, I changed it this morning to lock the votes in since now the event has occurred.

Why would you want people to change their prediction after the fact?


because I don't feel the need to control other people - let them do what they want

edit: now we can debate just how far this will go and what the guy who had no intention of invading sees as his endgame - I predict regime change with a Lukashenko type ally/puppet.

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 25 February 2022, 04:55
by Derek
The reddit memes are incredibly cringe

Did you guys know that Putin is GAY? That he's a HOMOSEXUAL who loves PENISES? Owned

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 25 February 2022, 11:23
by Brenden
pozzie wrote:
Brenden wrote:
pozzie wrote:Sorry folks. I thought the poll was set up to allow us to change our votes - that had been my intent and I thought it was possible yesterday. Today I noticed it wasn't. You can change your votes if you like now.

lol, I changed it this morning to lock the votes in since now the event has occurred.

Why would you want people to change their prediction after the fact?

because I don't feel the need to control other people - let them do what they want

Ending the ability to change how people responded to a poll about a future event which has now come to pass has nothing to do with controlling people. What a weird take.

Re: Russia & Ukraine

Unread postPosted: 25 February 2022, 14:03
by Brenden
I am surprised that there has been, like, absolutely no mention of The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia (Основы геополитики: геополитическое будущее России) by Aleksandr Dugin (1997), which is basically a textbook for Russian political and military leaders, in discussions about Ukraine anywhere I've seen them taking place.

Украина как самостоятельное государство с какими-то территориальными амбициями представляет собой огромную опасность для всей Евразии, и без решения украинской проблемы вообще говорить о континентальной геополитике бессмысленно. Это не значит, что культурно-языковая или экономическая автономия Украины должна быть ограничена, и что она должна стать чисто административным сектором русского централизирован ного государства (как, до некоторой степени, обстояли дела в царской империи или при СССР). Но стратегиче ски Украина должна быть строго проекцией Москвы на юге и западе (хотя подробнее о возможных моделях переструктурализации пойдет речь в главе о Западе).


Ukraine, as an independent state with some kind of territorial ambitions, poses a huge danger to the whole of Eurasia, and it makes no sense to talk about continental geopolitics without solving the Ukrainian problem. This does not mean that the cultural-linguistic or economic autonomy of Ukraine should be limited, and that it should become a purely administrative sector of the Russian centralized state (as, to some extent, things were in the tsarist empire or under the USSR). But strategically, Ukraine should be strictly a projection of Moscow to the south and west (although more about possible models of restructuring will be discussed in the chapter on the West).

Вопрос Украины более сложен, хотя модель геополитического состава этого государства очень сходна. Здесь, правда, важную роль играет геополитический масштаб Украины, которой представляет собой гигантское территориальное образование, превышающее по объему многие крупные европейские державы. Несравнимо более активен на Украине и сепаратизм, и тенденции политиче ского суверенитета. Украина как государство не имеет никакого геополитического смысла. У нее нет ни особенной культурной вести универсального значения, ни географической уникальности, ни этнической исключительности. Исторический смысл Украины отражен в самом ее названии «Украина», т.е. «окраина», «пограничные территории». В эпоху Киевской Руси территории нынешней Украины были центром государственности восточных славян, для которых в то время Владимир (позже Москва) был восточной окраиной («украиной»), а Новгород северной. Но по мере превращения Руси из славянского государства в евразийскую империю геополитические функции крупнейших центров радикально поменяли свое значение. Столицей империи стала Москва, а Киев превратился во второстепенный центр, в котором сходились евразийское и среднеевро пейское влияния. Ни о каком синтезе культур не могло быть и речи. Скорее всего, более архаические, сугубо русские православные пласты подвергались динамическому более «модернистическому» воздействию Западной Европы особенно через Польшу на западе и Австро-Венгрию на юго-западе. Безусловно, украинские культура и язык своеобразны и уникальны, но какого бы то ни было универсального значения они лишены. Казаческие поселения, которые образовали, в значительной мере, украинский этнос, отличались независимостью, особым этическим, хозяйственным и социальным укладом. Но всех этих элементов недостаточно для геополитической самостоятельности, а потамическая карта Украины, где главные реки (Днестр, Днепр и т.д.) текут параллельно друг другу, объясняет замедленное развитие украинской государственности.


The issue of Ukraine is more complex, although the model of the geopolitical composition of this state is very similar. Here, however, an important role is played by the geopolitical scale of Ukraine, which is a gigantic territorial entity, exceeding in volume many major European powers. Incomparably more active in Ukraine are both separatism and tendencies of political sovereignty. Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical meaning. It has no particular cultural message of universal significance, no geographic uniqueness, no ethnic exclusivity. The historical meaning of Ukraine is reflected in its very name "Ukraine", i.e. "outskirts", "border territories". In the era of Kievan Rus, the territories of present-day Ukraine were the center of the statehood of the Eastern Slavs, for whom at that time Vladimir (later Moscow) was the eastern outskirts (“Ukraine”), and Novgorod was the northern one. But as Russia turned from a Slavic state into a Eurasian empire, the geopolitical functions of the largest centers radically changed their meaning. Moscow became the capital of the empire, and Kiev became a secondary center where Eurasian and Central European influences converged. There was no question of any synthesis of cultures. Most likely, the more archaic, purely Russian Orthodox strata were subjected to the dynamic more "modern" influence of Western Europe, especially through Poland in the west and Austria-Hungary in the southwest. Undoubtedly, Ukrainian culture and language are original and unique, but they lack any universal meaning. The Cossack settlements, which formed, to a large extent, the Ukrainian ethnos, were distinguished by independence, a special ethical, economic and social structure. But all these elements are not enough for geopolitical independence, and the potamic map of Ukraine, where the main rivers (Dniester, Dnieper, etc.) flow parallel to each other, explains the slow development of Ukrainian statehood.

Дальнейшее существование унитарной Украины недопустимо. Эта территория должна быть поделена на несколько поясов, соответствующих гамме геополитических и этнокультурных реальностей.
1) Восточная Украина (все, что лежит восточнее Днепра от Чернигова до Азовского моря) представляет собой компактно заселенную территорию с преобладанием великоросского этноса и православным малороссийским населением. Вся эта территория безусловно близка к России, связана с ней культурно, исторически, этнически, религиозно. Это прекрасно освоенная, технически развитая область вполне может составлять самостоятельный геополитический регион, с широкой автономией, но в безусловном и крепчайшем союзе с Москвой. Здесь предпочтительней меридианальная интеграция, связь Харьковской области с более северными (Белгородская, Курская и Брянская области) собственно русскими территориями и распространение конструкции к югу.
2) Крым это особое геополитическое образование, традиционно отличающееся этнической мозаичностью. Малороссы, великороссы и крымские татары расселены в Крыму в очень сложной конфигурации и представляют собой три достаточно враждебных друг другу геополити ческим импульса. Великороссы ориентированы подчеркнуто промосковски (более агрессивно, чем на остальной Украине, даже Восточной). Малороссы, напротив, крайне националистичны. Крымские татары вообще ориентиро ваны больше на Турцию и довольно враждебны России. Об учете геополитической ориентации крымских татар вообще не может идти речи, так как Турция во всех отношениях является прямым геополитическим противником России. Но с наличием в Крыму татар не считаться также нельзя. Прямое присоединение Крыма к России вызовет крайне негативную реакцию малороссий ского населения и создаст проблемы интеграции этого полуострова в российскую систему через украинские территории, что вообще мало реально. Оставлять Крым «суверенной Украине» также невозможно, поскольку это создает прямую угрозу геополитической безопасности России и порождает этническую напряженность в самом Крыму. При учете всех этих соображений напрашивает ся вывод о необходимости придания Крыму особого статуса и обеспечения максимальной автономии при прямом стратегическом контроле Москвы, но с учетом социально-экономических интересов Украины и этнокуль турных требований крымских татар.
3) Центральная часть Украины от Чернигова до Одессы, куда попадает и Киев, представляет собой другую законченную область, где этнически доминирует малороссий ский этнос и язык, но преобладающей конфессией является православие. Эта православная Малороссия представляет собой самостоятельную геополитическую реальность, культурно родственную Восточной Украине и безусловно входящую в евразийскую геополитическую систему.
4) Западная Украина неоднородна. На Севере это Волынь, отдельный регион, южнее Львовская область (Галиция), еще южнее Закарпатье (западный выступ), и наконец, восточная часть Бесарабии. Все эти регионы представляют собой довольно самостоятельные области. На Волыни преобладают униаты и католики, эта область культурно принадлежит католическому геополитическо му сектору Средней Европы. Почти такая же картина в Галиции и Закарпатье, хотя эти более южные земли представляют собой отдельную геополитическую реальность. Волынь исторически связана с Польшей, а Галиция и Закарпатье с Австро-венгерской империей. Бессараб ские земли Украины населены смешанным населением, где малороссы и великороссы перемежаются румынами и молдаванами. Этот регион практически целиком православный и представляет собой православный пояс, наискось уходящий от Великороссии на Балканы к Сербии. Весь сектор от Бесарабии до Одессы следует отнести к центрально-украинскому геополитическому пространст ву, поэтому его логичнее включать в меридианальный левобережный пояс Днепра, западная граница которого простирается от Ровно до Ивано-Франковска по оси Север Юг и далее по Днестру до Одессы на юге.


The further existence of a unitary Ukraine is unacceptable. This territory should be divided into several zones corresponding to the range of geopolitical and ethno-cultural realities.
1) Eastern Ukraine (everything that lies east of the Dnieper from Chernigov to the Sea of ​​Azov) is a compactly populated territory with a predominance of the Great Russian ethnic group and the Orthodox Little Russian population. All this territory is certainly close to Russia, connected with it culturally, historically, ethnically, religiously. This well-developed, technically advanced region may well constitute an independent geopolitical region, with broad autonomy, but in an unconditional and strongest alliance with Moscow. Here, meridional integration is preferable, the connection of the Kharkov region with the more northern (Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk regions) proper Russian territories and the spread of the structure to the south.
2) Crimea is a special geopolitical entity, traditionally characterized by ethnic mosaic. Little Russians, Great Russians and Crimean Tatars are settled in Crimea in a very complex configuration and represent three geopolitical impulses quite hostile to each other. The Great Russians are emphatically pro-Moscow (more aggressively than in the rest of Ukraine, even Eastern). Little Russians, on the contrary, are extremely nationalistic. Crimean Tatars are generally more Turkish-oriented and rather hostile to Russia. There can be no question of taking into account the geopolitical orientation of the Crimean Tatars, since Turkey is in all respects a direct geopolitical opponent of Russia. But the presence of Tatars in Crimea cannot be ignored either. The direct annexation of Crimea to Russia will cause an extremely negative reaction of the Little Russian population and will create problems for the integration of this peninsula into the Russian system through Ukrainian territories, which is generally unrealistic. Leaving Crimea to “sovereign Ukraine” is also impossible, as this poses a direct threat to Russia’s geopolitical security and generates ethnic tensions in Crimea itself. Taking into account all these considerations, the conclusion suggests itself that it is necessary to give Crimea a special status and ensure maximum autonomy under the direct strategic control of Moscow, but taking into account the socio-economic interests of Ukraine and the ethno-cultural requirements of the Crimean Tatars.
3) The central part of Ukraine from Chernigov to Odessa, where Kiev also falls, is another complete region where the Little Russian ethnic group and language dominate ethnically, but Orthodoxy is the predominant confession. This Orthodox Little Russia is an independent geopolitical reality, culturally akin to Eastern Ukraine and certainly included in the Eurasian geopolitical system.
4) Western Ukraine is heterogeneous. In the North, this is Volyn, a separate region, to the south of the Lviv region (Galicia), even to the south of Transcarpathia (western ledge), and finally, the eastern part of Bessarabia. All these regions are quite independent regions. Uniates and Catholics predominate in Volhynia, this area culturally belongs to the Catholic geopolitical sector of Central Europe. The picture is almost the same in Galicia and Transcarpathia, although these more southerly lands represent a separate geopolitical reality. Volyn is historically connected with Poland, and Galicia and Transcarpathia with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Bessarabian lands of Ukraine are inhabited by a mixed population, where Little Russians and Great Russians alternate with Romanians and Moldavians. This region is almost entirely Orthodox and is an Orthodox belt, going obliquely from Great Russia to the Balkans to Serbia. The entire sector from Bessarabia to Odessa should be attributed to the Central Ukrainian geopolitical space, so it is more logical to include it in the meridional left-bank belt of the Dnieper, the western border of which extends from Rivne to Ivano-Frankivsk along the North-South axis and further along the Dniester to Odessa in the south.